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Many employers were shocked and alarmed when
the U.S. Supreme Court in June 2006 unanimously
established a relatively broad standard regarding
employees’ complaints of retaliation by employers
when employees have made discrimination com-
plaints. An examination of case law as well as com-
ments made by those attending the 2006 Labor and
Employment Law Roundtable at the Cornell University
School of Hotel Administration allow us to conclude
that although employees who make complaints need
to be treated carefully, employers need not panic.
Instead, they must thoroughly document any person-
nel actions and base them on actual performance,
making sure that any termination or demotion is, in
fact, not a retaliation.
Keywords: retaliation; protected expression;
discrimination; employment; roundtable
Each year, the Labor and Employment LawRoundtable sponsored by the Center forHospitality Research at the Cornell University
School of Hotel Administration features discussions
concerning various aspects of employment discrimi-
nation. In the past, we have discussed sexual harass-
ment, mixed-motive jury instructions, dress codes,
and wage and hour class actions. The 2006 Roundtable
was the first in which participants discussed retalia-
tion, a cause of action where an employee alleges that
the employer has made a detrimental job decision in
response to the employee’s having made a discrimi-
nation claim. Claims of this type are among the
fastest growing and have become one of the most
prevalent type of discrimination case.1 The Supreme
Court issued a decision on retaliation shortly after the
Roundtable concluded, leading to articles in the Wall
Street Journal, the New York Times, and numerous other
media outlets, making retaliation a much-discussed
discrimination-law claim. As a result of the prevalence
of retaliation claims being discussed in the media and
decided in the courts, employers are wise to under-
stand the law regarding retaliation. Employers should
(1) understand how to take the necessary precautions
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to avoid violating the law in this area; and
(2) prevent, or at least defend, frivolous
claims. The purpose of this article is to
explain the law of retaliation, to suggest
ways to avoid running afoul of the law,
and to provide strategies for employers to
anticipate and defend against such claims.
Before we address these issues, however,
we examine the statistical increase in
retaliation claims and hypothesize why
these cases are on the rise.
The Rise of Retaliation Claims
As many readers know, employees may
not file discrimination charges in federal
court without first filing charges of dis-
crimination with either the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or
with an affiliated state or local agency
(commonly referred to as “FEPA”—Fair
Employment Practice Agency. As a result of
this requirement, one may track the per-
centages of the different types of employ-
ment discrimination claims by analyzing
EEOC or FEPA charge statistics. In the
1980s and early 1990s, the EEOC and state
FEPAs received a similar number of charges
each year. FEPA charge data are often dif-
ficult to find, but EEOC data are readily
available. There is no reason to believe
that evaluating FEPA charges would result
in different findings from the EEOC
numbers. Consequently, EEOC data are
evaluated herein to distinguish trends in
the different types of claims filed.
The EEOC provides information on each
of the statutes that this federal agency
enforces: Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Equal Pay
Act. Title VII prohibits employment dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, and gender. The
other statutes add further protection, as
suggested in their titles. Each statute makes
it unlawful to retaliate against an employee
who complains about discrimination based
on any of the protected classes.
In the past thirteen years, the number of
employment discrimination charges filed
with the EEOC has ranged from a low of
seventy-two thousand charges in 1992 to a
high of ninety-one thousand in 1994. In
2005, seventy-five thousand charges were
filed. Because of this year-to-year fluctua-
tion, using raw numbers to evaluate which
claims are most prevalent is not infor-
mative. Instead, we analyzed the annual
change in the percentage of claims filed.
The largest single-year percentage change
occurred with the number of ADA claims
filed in 1992 and in 1993. Only 1.4 percent
of the cases filed in 1992 were ADA cases,
while in 1993 the ADA made up 17.4 per-
cent of the total EEOC cases. This jump is
easily explained by the fact that the ADA
took effect in July 1992. Thereafter, the
ADA cases made up between 17.4 percent
and 23.1 percent of discrimination claims.
Other than the fluctuation in disability
claims, claims based on other protected
classes have exhibited a fluctuation no
greater than 7.2 percentage points. Claims
based on age (ADEA), for instance, made
up 27.1 percent of the case load in 1992
but dropped to 19.9 percent of the cases in
1995. In 2005, ADEA cases made up 22.0
percent of the total claims filed. These
fluctuations seem to be nothing more than
random variability, and we can report little
in terms of a trend for these causes of
action. One cause of action, however, has
exhibited a dramatic increase that is not
easily explained. That cause is retaliation.
In 1993, retaliation claims made up
15.3 percent of the total cases brought. By
2005, that percentage almost doubled, to
29.5 percent. Retaliation claims now
account for more than a quarter of the
EEOC’s docket. Moreover, unlike any other
category, the percentage of retaliation claims
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We can only speculate on the reasons
for the increase in claims. One theory is
that expanded employee training leads to
more retaliation claims. In summer 1998
the Supreme Court, in Burlington Industries
v. Ellerth and Faragher v. Boca Raton, held
that employers could avoid liability for
sexual harassment if the employee did
not suffer a tangible loss and the employer
proved that (1) the employer “exercised
reasonable care to prevent and promptly
correct any sexually harassing behavior”
and (2) the plaintiff “unreasonably failed
to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to otherwise avoid harm.”3 On
the theory that “reasonable care” required
training, many employers implemented
programs to train employees. Some Round-
table participants argued that such educa-
tion increased employee awareness and
ultimately increased retaliation claims.
However, the large increase in retaliation
claims began before this decision. In the
eight years after the decision, from 1998 to
2005, retaliation cases rose from 22.6 per-
cent to 29.5 percent of the total charges, an
increase of 30 percent. From 1992 to
1997, however, the retaliation claims rose
from 15.3 percent to 22.6 percent, a 48
percent increase. We consider it difficult to
attribute the growth in retaliation claims to
the training programs implemented in the
wake of Ellerth and Faragher.
Another theory is that the increase in
retaliation claims results from employees
(or their counsel) recognizing that they are
more likely to prevail in retaliation claims
than with other types of discrimination
charges. To begin with, it is difficult to pre-
vail on a discrimination claim because the
employee must show membership in a
protected class, a truly adverse employ-
ment action, and evidence of discrimina-
tion. Because it is difficult to find evidence
of discrimination in failure-to-hire cases,
most discrimination cases are filed after
the employer terminates the employee. 
After the claimant has lost a job, itis 
often easy to tack on a retaliation  claimto
the broader discrimination case. Roundtable
participants explained that employees often
make less than genuine discrimination com-
plaints as a temporary means of establishing
job security, particularly when the threat of
losing one’s job is high. After the flimsy dis-
crimination case is terminated, the only
legitimate claim is one of retaliation.
In both “tack-on cases” and stand-alone
cases, employees can file retaliation claims
even though they are not members of a
protected class, they have not suffered a
severe adverse employment action, and 
the only evidence of discrimination involves
the timing of the filing. Thus, retaliation
opens the door to arguably less meritori-
ous claims.
We cannot support the “tack-on” expla-
nation from discrimination-law statistics,
in part because of statistical quirks in the
EEOC data. The quirkiness of the EEOC
statistics arises as follows. A fifty-two-
year-old Canadian-American female alco-
holic who believes she was unlawfully
terminated from her job can allege dis-
crimination based on an age, national ori-
gin, gender, and disability. Even though
one might say that there are four discrimi-
nation causes in this situation, the EEOC
counts this filing as one claim. When break-
ing the claims down by types of discrimi-
nation, however, this one claim is counted
in each of the four categories under which
the claimant filed. If the claimant also filed
a retaliation claim, her charge would appear
 352 Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly NOVEMBER 2006
CHR LEGAL ROUNDTABLE RETALIATION
CQ294542.qxd  10/3/2006  5:42 PM  Page 352
NOVEMBER 2006 Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly 353
RETALIATION CHR LEGAL ROUNDTABLE
in five distinct categories. As stated above,
the Roundtable participants agreed that it
is common for a retaliation claim to be
attached to another type of claim even
though the law of retaliation does not
make this a necessity. As a result, it is pos-
sible that retaliation claims have not
replaced other claims and instead are just
tacked onto an increasing number of cases
that would have been filed under other the-
ories. Regardless of the reasons for the
increase, retaliation claims are on the rise
and managers need to understand the law
of retaliation.
The Law of Retaliation
Retaliation, under the discrimination law,
occurs when an employee engages in a “pro-
tected expression,” suffers discrimination,
and there is a link between the protected
expression and the adverse employment
action.4 For this discussion, we need to exam-
ine what constitutes (1) protected expres-
sion, (2) discrimination, and (3) a causal
link. The recent Supreme Court case defined
“discrimination,” but first we discuss “pro-
tected expression.”
Protected Expression
A protected expression, in its most gen-
eral terms, occurs when an employee com-
plains that the employer is violating
discrimination law. The discrimination
does not have to involve the complaining
employee. For example, a male employee
who complains that women are being sex-
ually harassed may be engaging in a pro-
tected expression.
In Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale
and Retail Stores, the question before the
court was this matter of what constituted
a protected expression.5 In this case, the
employee, Payne, believed that his employer
refused to hire people of color into positions
where employees would have to handle
money. Payne, who was laid off each year
during the summer slow months, joined a
civil rights group that picketed in front of the
employer’s store. After the picketing
occurred, the employer did not rehire Payne,
who alleged retaliation. The employer
argued that by picketing, Payne had not
engaged in a protected expression for two
reasons. First, the employer argued that
Payne’s allegations of racial discrimination
were unfounded and, thus, could not be a
protected expression. That is, the employer
argued that employees cannot succeed on a
retaliation claim unless they first prove that
the underlying claim of employment dis-
crimination about which they complained
did occur and that the employer did, in fact,
violate the law. Next, the employer argued
that even if this is not the case, Payne had not
engaged in a protected expression because
picketing is not covered under retaliation
law. The court addressed the first issue fully
but did not really address the second.
In rejecting the employer’s first claim,
the court held that the employee engaged
in a protected expression even if the
underlying claim failed and the employer
had not, in fact, violated the law. Instead,
the court held that the employee only
needed to have a “good faith reasonable
belief” that the subject of the complaint
was true. The reason for allowing a good
faith reasonable belief to suffice is that
such a standard prevents any chilling
effect on expression. If employees had to
prove that their employer violated the 
law before they could make any allega-
tion, employees would be reluctant to take
advantage of company antiharassment poli-
cies and to file EEOC claims. The Ellerth
court contends that the key to ending dis-
crimination is employee complaints fol-
lowed by swift employer action (as do
numerous other opinions, law review arti-
cles, and other commentary). The chilling
effect that would occur if courts accept the
employer’s argument in Payne runs
counter to that contention.
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Having underlined the importance of
avoiding a chilling effect on employees’
complaints, we note, however, that the
“good faith reasonable belief” standard is
fraught with problems. For the sake of
argument, what if Payne’s argument was
simply false? Let us assume that the
employer in Payne offers the jobs in ques-
tion to its two most senior employees, both
of whom are individuals of color. For their
own reasons, however, each employee
turns down the employer’s offer of the
cash-handling job. The employer moves
on and offers the position to the third-
most-senior employee, who happens to be
white, and who accepts the job. Payne,
however, has no way of knowing the true
facts and jumps to the conclusion that the
two most senior employees, both of whom
are African American, were passed over
in favor of white employees for the cash-
handling job. In good faith but totally wrong,
Payne notifies the EEOC that the employer
violated the law. The EEOC begins an
investigation that the local newspaper
makes into a front-page story. Soon there
is a protest going on outside the employer’s
front door. People are holding signs accus-
ing the employer of being a racist. The
employer’s business is suffering, the owners’
standing in the community is greatly
diminished, and the owners’ families are
being harangued—all because of a com-
pletely false accusation. Furious, the owners
simply do not wish to continue to employ
the individual who caused all of this pain
and suffering by making a false accusation.
The owners wish to terminate the employee,
but retaliation law prohibits it.
Unfortunately, we cannot resolve this
knotty situation. Even though the hypo-
thetical employee was wrong and caused
much grief, the employer cannot lawfully
terminate this employee. Doing so would
be a clear case of unlawful retaliation and
would result in back pay, reinstatement,
attorneys’ fees, and possibly punitive and
compensatory damages. This does not
mean that all retaliation complaints will
result in short- or even long-term job secu-
rity. Not all complaints are considered to
be in made in good faith or considered rea-
sonable. All that we can do here is to pro-
vide more information on how courts have
defined the term good faith reasonable
belief.
In most jurisdictions, the term good
faith reasonable belief means that (1) the
complaining party subjectively believes
that the employer violated the law and
(2) a reasonable person would also believe
that the employer violated the law. The
first element is relatively simple for employ-
ees to prove. Absent evidence to the con-
trary, the employees must simply testify
that they believed that they were complain-
ing about a violation of the discrimination
law. However, the “objective” (reasonable
person) element of the test is much more
complex.
A number of courts have held that for a
complaint to be “reasonable” and, thus, a
protected expression, the facts, if true, must
violate the law. For example, in Hammer v.
St. Vincent Hospital and Health Care Center,
the employee contended that he was ter-
minated in retaliation for complaining that
he was being “sexually harassed” because
of his homosexuality.6 In dismissing the
case, the court held that because harass-
ment based on sexual orientation is not
prohibited by Title VII, an employee can-
not make out a case of unlawful retaliation
based on a complaint about orientation.
In other words, because an employer can
legally harass an employee due to sexual
orientation, an employer can terminate an
employee who complains of such conduct.
While this concept may seem unfair to some,
it does make sense, and we do not see any
legal problems for employers who terminate
employees when they complain of conduct
that is, by definition, outside the purview
of Title VII. The law gets more complex,
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however, when the complaint concerns an
action that is not yet a legal violation but
could develop into unlawful activity.
In Clark County v. Breeden the plaintiff
(a woman), a male employee, and their
male supervisor met to review the psycho-
logical evaluation reports of four job appli-
cants.7 The report for one of the applicants
disclosed that one applicant had once com-
mented to a coworker, “I hear making love
to you is like making love to the Grand
Canyon.” At the meeting the supervisor
read the comment aloud, looked at the
female employee, and stated, “I don’t know
what that means.” The other employee then
said, “Well, I’ll tell you later,” and both men
chuckled. The plaintiff later complained to
several different supervisors about the com-
ment. She subsequently suffered an adverse
employment action and filed a retaliation
claim. In dismissing the case, the Supreme
Court held that employee could not make
out a case of retaliation because no reason-
able person would consider this one com-
ment to rise to the level of unlawful
harassment. This holding is on point with
Hammer. The facts alleged, even if true, do
not violate the law, and thus the employee
cannot have a reasonable belief (of unlaw-
ful action). Thus, under Breeden, one can
argue that a complaint about harassment
that is not yet severe or pervasive enough to
be unlawful sexual harassment does not
constitute a protected expression.
There is, however, a problem with this
analysis. In Ellerth, the Supreme Court made
it clear that employees should complain of
harassing actions before they rise to the
level of being unlawful. Indeed, subse-
quent case law has held that employees
who wait too long to report are unreason-
able and will have their cases dismissed. It
simply makes no sense to require employ-
ees to report before the harassment becomes
unlawful and then not to protect such
a complaint. Therefore, we believe that
employers should not dismiss complaints
over harassment that does not rise to the
unlawful level, because courts, in the future,
may find these complaints to be protected
expressions.
There is another reason to not dismiss
these complaints. As explained above, the
Ellerth defense requires employees to
exercise reasonable care to prevent and
correct sexual harassment. Employers who
retaliate against those who complain about
conduct that does not rise to the level of
unlawful harassment may prevail in that
retaliation claim but will likely jeopardize
the company’s ability to ever invoke the
Ellerth defense. Employees will contend
that they did not complain because an
employee who did complain experienced
retaliation. We believe a court will likely
accept this argument and find the noncom-
plaining employee to be reasonable.
A protected expression exists when the
conduct that draws the complaint, if true,
would violate the law. It does not exist
when such conduct does not violate the
law. We believe, however, that employers
need to take a closer look at this concept
and treat an expression as protected if the
conduct could violate the law if it contin-
ued or became more severe. If the expres-
sion is protected, the next question is,
What does constitute discrimination?
Discrimination
On June 22, 2006, in a 9-0 ruling, in the
case of Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. White, the U.S. Supreme
Court “settled” the split among circuit
courts over the definition of discrimination
in retaliation cases.8 Before White, the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits held that retalia-
tory action must involve some “ultimate”
employment decision like a failure to hire
or a termination of employment. The
Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits, though,
NOVEMBER 2006 Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly 355
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held that the alleged retaliation must yield
an adverse effect on the terms, conditions,
or benefits of employment. The Supreme
Court rejected both of these approaches,
holding instead that Title VII’s retaliation
provisions are much broader.
In White, the plaintiff alleged that in
retaliation for complaining about sexual
discrimination, she was (1) removed from
her forklift duty and assigned to perform
standard track labor duties and (2) sus-
pended for thirty-seven days without pay.9
The suspension was then rescinded and
back pay provided after White invoked the
company’s internal grievance procedures.
In the initial trial, the jury found that
(1) the employee did engage in a protected
expression and (2) the expression moti-
vated the employer to reassign and sus-
pend the employee. The remaining question
for the Court was whether these two actions
constituted discrimination under the retal-
iation law. The employer argued that neither
the transfer nor the suspension constituted
unlawful “discrimination.” To support this
contention, the employer relied on the hold-
ings of several circuits, all of which held
that the challenged action must “result in
an adverse effect on the ‘terms, conditions,
or benefits’ of employment.” To further
support its case, the employer cited the
fact that the Fifth and the Eighth Circuits
had, as stated above, adopted a more restric-
tive approach that limited actionable retal-
iatory conduct to acts “such as hiring,
granting leave, discharging, promoting,
and compensating.”
In rejecting both of these standards, the
Court established a standard similar to that
of the Seventh and D.C. Circuits. To estab-
lish discrimination, the employee must
prove “that a reasonable employee would
have found the challenged action materi-
ally adverse,” which in this context means
it well might have “dissuaded a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge
of discrimination.” In other words the
employee needs to prove that the employer’s
action would have a chilling effect on
employee complaints.
Employers’ reaction to this broad hold-
ing has been a combination of shock and
fear. Employers are shocked that the first
employment case from the supposedly
conservative Roberts Court (so named for
Chief Justice John Roberts) would be a
unanimous, employee-friendly decision.
Employers fear that this holding will have
a huge impact on the workplace. We under-
stand the shock but disagree with the fear.
We believe that the effects of this new
standard on employers are overstated.
First, the two actions that the employee
complained about—that is, the reassign-
ment and the suspension—are not trivial.
We believe that most employers would
accept the idea that basing such decisions
on the fact that an employee alleged 
sexual discrimination would be unlawful.
Second, adverse actions that would not
carry a claim under sex discrimination (or
any other type of discrimination based on
a protected class) are unlikely to make it
into court or even catch the attention of the
EEOC. The starting point for most dis-
crimination lawsuits is the amount of the
back pay that the employer owes. When
there is no termination, there is no back
pay. While an employee who has not been
terminated can request punitive and com-
pensatory damages, the conduct must be
reckless or malicious—a standard that is
deemed more extreme than the conduct
necessary to receive back pay under the dis-
crimination laws. Similarly, the employee
can claim a constructive discharge, but
again this adverse action must be more
serious than that which would satisfy 
the discrimination law. Accordingly, we
simply do not believe that this will open
the door to a large number of new merito-
rious claims.
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Most important, the White case does not
change the advice that we would provide to
managers. If an employee complains about
discrimination, (1) do not retaliate in any
way against that person because of the com-
plaint and (2) make sure that you have a
legitimate reason for any subsequent nega-
tive treatment of the employee for the fore-
seeable future. In other words, make sure
you can support any employment decision
that in any way punishes an employee who
had previously complained of discrimina-
tion. This does not mean, however, that the
White case is meaningless. A common prac-
tice for employers who were faced with a
harassment complaint from an underper-
forming employee was to put the employee
on a performance improvement plan. Under
White, such a plan would likely be seen
as satisfying the discrimination element of
the test. Thus, employers need to be more
careful in their treatment of complaining
employees and must consult with counsel
before they make any such decision. The
obvious question that arises from this advice
is, How long must the employer treat a com-
plaining employee with kid gloves?
The Causal Link
We see an EEOC retaliation claim as one
of the best short-term job-security measures
for an at-risk employee, given that employ-
ers will always be reluctant to terminate an
employee who has made such a claim. If the
employer has done its homework, however,
filing a claim will not always buy time 
for an underperforming employee. While
employers can never base a decision on the
fact that the employee made a complaint,
employers who have documented poor per-
formance or unacceptable behavior can,
with the advice of counsel, make an adverse
employment decision, including termina-
tion. The key is documentation and a history
of making similar decisions to similarly
situated employees regardless of whether
they have engaged in protected expressions.
With documentation and consistent human
resources practice, it may make sense to go
forward with any type of discipline up to
and including termination. Without those
elements, there is no way to predict how
long a protected expression, absent evidence
to support cause, will be seen as being a link
to a future adverse action. There are, how-
ever, a number of cases that do weigh in on
the issue.
When an adverse employment action is
made soon after a protected expression,
courts will almost always infer retalia-
tion.10 The problem is that no law states
when this inference would end. The
Second Circuit, for instance, has held that
there is no finite answer.11 Other circuits
have come to a number of different con-
clusions, holding that three,12 four,13 or
five14 months are too long to make an
inference of retaliation with any evidence
of discrimination. Employers who wish to
make a decision negatively affecting an
employee who has made a protected
expression need to check with counsel to
see whether the circuit where the employer
is located has made a bright-line ruling on
the time issue. After a certain point, the
protected expression will no longer carry
much weight.
Implications for Managers
Before the White case, retaliation was
the fastest growing of all discrimination
claims. As is often the case with Supreme
Court decisions, the reaction to White was
swift and loud. Employers (and their advo-
cates), playing their best Chicken Little
role, screamed that the sky was falling.
Employees (and their advocates) declared
victory. We, on the other hand, believe that
White’s effects will be typical of that of
recent Supreme Court decisions on employ-
ment law. In the past several years, cases
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on the ADA, arbitration, and sexual harass-
ment have all been hailed as changing the
face of discrimination law. The effects of
each decision have been minimal at best.
We therefore predict that while White will
lead to an initial increase in tack-on
claims, as well as stand-alone claims, the
holding should not really affect employ-
ers’ ability to operate or defend claims.
Still, because of White, employers need to
make sure that they document anything
that could be construed as a protected
expression, that they never let a complaint
be the basis of any decision, and, most
important, that they have full documenta-
tion before they make employment deci-
sions. Employees who see a termination
on the horizon have an incentive to engage
in a protected expression in hopes of
establishing a claim of retaliation when
the inevitable occurs. While the basis of
the protected expression may fail, the
retaliation claim can stand on its own and
cost the employer hundreds of thousands
of dollars in time, legal fees, and damages.
Employers need to think about retaliation
before making any decisions.
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